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Introduction
There is a host of public policies that favour small over large fi rms, and it is common to defi ne benefi t eligibility by restrictions on the number of employees or on alternative measures of fi rm size. 1 There are often sound rationales for exempting small fi rms from complying with regulations, including the Americans with Disabilities Act that would otherwise impose disproportionate compliance costs on small businesses, and from fi ling a tax return, including that for a value-added tax (VAT) where the costs of administration does not justify the amount of tax collected from small tax payers. Yet, the tax and regulatory systems are rendered complex by the preferential treatment by fi rm size, giving rise to a clear concern about policy-induced distortions in fi rm behaviour. Despite the pervasiveness of policy thresholds, to this author's knowledge, the distortions are discussed in press but not well documented in the academic literature. There have been theoretical studies (Keen and Mintz, 2004; Dixon et al., 2004) and an empirical study (Schivardi and Trrini, 2004) focusing on the disincentives for fi rms to grow beyond the benefi t threshold out of concern for the benefi t eligibility. Though such behaviour is plausible for stand-alone fi rms, in practice, a fi rm can have a fl exible structure that allows it to respond in diverse ways without placing restriction on its growth. Just as so-called THE RESPONSE OF FIRMS TO ELIGIBILITY THRESHOLDS: EVIDENCE FROM THE JAPANESE VALUE-ADDED TAX tariff hopping in the context of foreign direct investment, where a fi rm creates a subsidiary in an importing country with a high tariff to bypass the tax, a large fi rm may avoid the loss of eligibility through a creation of multiple subsidiaries that are legally independent but have a common ownership and control, subject to legal provisions against such strategies. 2 Thus, the literature leaves undocumented a variety of behavioural responses that are potentially relevant in policy making.
The purpose of this paper is to document the behavioural response caused by a tax threshold in the context of the VAT introduced in Japan in 1989. The tax reform was an overhaul of the Japanese tax system affecting the economy of the nation, but what makes this policy change an attractive natural experiment is the sudden appearance of tax incentives and the availability of data that allows us to observe changes made in fi rm structure, a major obstacle in this line of study. This setting allows us to ask questions such as: How pervasive was the strategy to split corporations? How quickly did fi rms respond to the new tax incentives? What were the commonly separated business segments, if any?
In addition, though a study on a VAT threshold is an interest in itself 3 , it is particularly informative to focus on a tax setting, rather than a regulatory setting, since the gains from tax avoidance can be estimated reasonably. By understanding the tax gains to fi rms, we learn about the extent of revenue drains caused by tax avoidance, but in addition, we can gauge the extent of effi ciency losses which may result from fi rms choosing sub-optimal organizational structures (for example, Goolsbee and Maydew, 2002) . Given that a rational fi rm would not incur costs greater than the benefi ts, the amount of tax benefi ts is the upper bound for the effi ciency losses. Though the specifi city of the setting may render generalisation diffi cult 4 , this paper provides a tangible example of behavioural response that policy makers can expect from incorporating a threshold in legislation.
To this end, this paper considers two complementary identifi cation strategies that utilise a large sample of Japanese corporate groups. The data used in this paper is Affi liated Company Data (ACD), an annual survey of publicly-traded companies that collects information on their domestic subsidiaries. 5 To identify the overall infl uence of a policy threshold, we fi rst compare the size distribution of businesses in the neighbourhood of the threshold before and after the tax change. As there is a concern that confounding infl uences might mask any effects of the tax, we apply the semi-parametric technique developed by Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) to control for the other changes in the economy.
Though this approach has an intuitive appeal, it does not allow us to distinguish between different hypotheses on behavioural response. To test a hypothesis that the tax threshold induced corporations to split up, we next examine new group members founded under different tax regimes, since the direct consequence of corporate splitting is the addition of new members. Finally, this paper estimates tax benefi ts in the sample, distinguishing
No. 370, 2008 between windfall gains and tax-avoidance gains, and extrapolates to the population.
Evidence found in this study is consistent with the hypothesis that a policy threshold induces fi rms to restructure their organisations by splitting some of their member corporations. First, using a sample consisting of, on average, 14.8 thousand corporations each year, a comparison of the size distribution in 1988 and 1990 shows an increase in the density below the size threshold attributable to the tax reform of 1989. Statistical tests indicate that the difference is signifi cant, implying that the tax threshold exerts a strong infl uence. Second, we fi nd that the tax infl uenced the founding of 10.7 to 12.7
per cent of new corporations incorporated over July 1988 through March 1991, a period when tax incentives were relatively strong. Further examination shows that much of the behavioural response occurred within a year and a half after the implementation of the law, suggesting fi rms are quick in making adjustments to a new tax regime. Interestingly, a small annual tax benefi t, in order of $10,000 to $25,000 per company (in 1990 dollars 6 ), is a suffi cient tax motive, though it is the smaller groups in our sample that responded to this level of tax incentives. In conjunction with the result suggesting that it was common to separate transportation divisions, which would be relatively independent from other production processes, the effi ciency loss caused by tax-motivated restructuring would have been modest; the revenue loss due to tax-motivated splitting, which is the upper bound for the effi ciency loss in the economy, is 22 billion yen ($152 million) in 1990, or 3.4 per cent of the overall revenue drain due to the preferential tax treatment of small businesses. Nonetheless, horizontal equity of the Japanese VAT was impaired by the incorporation of the threshold.
This paper adds to the literature on tax avoidance by fi rms and relates to the studies on the effects of taxes on organisational structures. 7 Though tax incentives may be apparent to informed observers, including in the case of VAT thresholds 8 , the relevance to fi rm decisions is a matter of empirical question. Naturally, it is diffi cult to assess the pervasiveness of tax avoidance behaviour, and as a result of a lack of documentation, the practical importance of tax incentives is sometimes questioned, as in the textbook example of a multi-stage turnover tax. 9 In theory, this tax creates tax incentives to merge with upstream suppliers since the tax is levied at each point that goods change possession, but Williamson (1985) suggests that taxes are of minor consideration in vertical mergers. 10 It is beyond the scope of this paper to verify Williamson's suggestion, since our focus is not on the boundaries between economically independent units. Rather, this study aims to enhance the understanding of the boundaries between distinct legal entities belonging to a close-knit group. Thus, this study is relevant to the literature on business groups 11 , and in a broad sense, also relates to Stephens and Ward-Batts (2004) study on income shifting between husbands and wives. In light of Khanna and Yafeh (2005) who argue that the origin of business groups are not well understood, this paper contributes to the study of business groups by exploring the role of taxes in the formation of groupings.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the tax scheme to be exploited as a natural experiment and discusses preliminary evidence. Section 3 considers a semi-parametric approach, outlines its implementation, and presents evidence on the effects of a tax threshold on corporate size distribution. Section 4 turns to the corporate splitting hypothesis and considers a parametric approach. Section 5 estimates the revenue drain and presents the result extrapolated to the population. Section 6 concludes.
Tax Incentives

Simplifi ed Scheme
Against the backdrop of growing government debt and an aging population, a consumption-type VAT known as consumption tax was introduced in April 1989, replacing commodity taxes that had narrow bases. 12 Overall, the Japanese VAT had a simple structure; the tax rate was uniform at 3 per cent and relatively few items were exempted. 13 However, the treatment of small business was unusually generous by OECD standards, as a result of political concessions given by the leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to its business constituents. 14 The special treatment for small businesses included what is known as the simplifi ed fi ling scheme. A fi rm usually computes its tax liability by subtracting tax paid on inputs from tax collected on sales under the ordinary fi ling of a VAT. The main burden to a taxpayer is in the computation of the tax paid on inputs; the simplifi ed fi ling reduces this compliance cost by presuming that taxed inputs are 80 per cent of taxable sales, a common single rate for most industries. 15 Tax liability is then simply 0.6 per cent of taxable sales, thus converting a VAT into a turnover tax. The eligibility is defi ned in terms of the amount of sales in the base period, which is two years prior to the current tax year, and the threshold amount of sales is 500 million yen ($3.3 million) under the 1989 system. 96.7 per cent of all businesses were eligible in 1989, but they were small businesses that only accounted for 19 per cent of total turnover in the economy. 16 The main problem with the simplifi ed scheme is that it generates a hidden subsidy by, in essence, giving too much tax credit. Consider the effective tax payment by a seller under a x per cent VAT. In addition to the tax liable to the government ( x), the seller pays tax on its purchase of taxable inputs (c), which include materials as well as capital equip- 
where o t is a presumed rate of value-added of 20 per cent. The max function captures the legislation allowing low value-added tax payers to opt out from the scheme. A company therefore gains from the tax if its actual value-added ratio is greater than 20 per cent.
Thus, under the simplifi ed scheme, a hidden subsidy arises from the discrepancy between the actual and presumed rate of value added.
It is well recognised that the simplifi ed scheme compromised the revenue performance of the VAT through this drainage of tax revenue. Further, the system impaired horizontal equity since it did not account for the diversity in value-added ratios across industries, as documented below. Subsequent amendments addressed these concerns. In
October 1991, the presumed rate category was expanded to refl ect the actual rates to improve equity and the threshold was reduced to 400 million yen; in 1997 the threshold was lowered to 200 million yen. 18
Behavioural Response
Since it is the businesses with sales less than 500 million yen that are eligible for the simplifi ed scheme, the threshold creates incentives to shift sales to favourably taxed entities within a corporate group. 19 A variety of tax avoidance strategies is conceivable to achieve this end: foregoing sales beyond 500 million yen; falsely attributing sales to small entities; and transferring high value-added business segment to small group members. This paper focuses on a strategy involving splitting a corporation, and this section considers the benefi ts and costs of such strategy. Figure 1 shows levels of B for a company with a value-added ratio of 35 per cent, which is approximately the average for the manufacturing sector in 1989. 20 Tax benefi t is increasing in sales up to the threshold level, peaking at 2.3 million yen ($15,000) per annum. Two kink points for small sales arise from other preferential schemes for very small businesses; exemption and phasing out of exemption. Notice that unlike the personal exemption under a typical individual income tax, where the tax liability is based on the portion of income exceeding the exempted amount, because the sales determine the benefi t eligibility in our context, there is a sharp discontinuity at the threshold level of sales. Further, a tax benefi t from a single split can be greater than 2.3 million yen.
There is an anecdotal case where a producer of TV advertisements was divided into four separate entities. 21 Likewise, successfully dividing in half a company with 1 billion yen in sales would yield tax benefi t twice the size of the peak amount. Table 1 illustrates tax incentives by industry under the tax regime of 1989 and of 1991. The average value-added ratios for each industry are shown in the fi rst column and the presumed rates under the 1989 and 1991 regime are shown in the second and third column respectively. Since the value added is diverse across industries but the presumed value added does not vary very much in 1989, the tax benefi ts vary as shown in the fourth column. For example, the tax benefi t to a real estate company with sales of 500 million is 3.8 million yen per year, which is 18 times as much as that of a retail company. Nonetheless, People's Finance Corporation (1994) reports a case involving a retail company, indicating a possible within-industry variation. 22 The amendment in October 1991 adjusted presumed rates, so that the degree of diversity and the level of incentives were reduced, as shown in the last column.
There is a complication in assessing the tax benefi t since it is taxable under corporate income tax. The effective rate was 49.98 per cent in 1989 23 but it is diffi cult to know how much is in fact recaptured by the authority in practice, since 48 per cent of corporations reported tax losses in 1990 and income may be hidden through other avoidance strategies. Furthermore, there is a favourable tax consequence in creating small corporations (for example, higher deductibility of entertainment expenses and a lower tax rate for income below 8 million yen). Thus, the tax benefi t may be reduced by an income tax but not to its full extent.
In theory, the decision to split a corporation depends also on the costs involved in organising a business in a way a fi rm would not have chosen in the absence of the tax incentives: Goolsbee and Maydew (2002) suggest the principle-agent cost might be aggravated; it may be administratively inconvenient to maintain separate legal entities; by founding a new corporation, a fi rm incurs administrative as well as registration costs. 24 The effect of the threshold in inducing corporate splitting was a concern to the policy makers, and therefore, the tax code contains provisions against this tax avoidance strategy.
However, the effectiveness of these provisions is questionable. There was no provision for splitting involving sole proprietors, and even the law on corporations was not tight.
A divested corporation is not recognised to be a separate entity from its parent for the purpose of the VAT, depending on the method of fi nancing the paid-in capital, the ownership of the stocks, and the activity of the divested company. 25 There is suffi cient room to adjust the legal transaction that a fi rm can easily avoid being consolidated. 26 Therefore the legal deterrence seems suffi ciently weak and whether the costs outweigh the tax benefi ts is an empirical question.
Preliminary Evidence
In addition to the anecdotes mentioned above, there is a case in our dataset indicating the relevance of the simplifi ed scheme on a fi rm's reorganisation decision. 27 The case involves a corporate group headed by S-Line Co. which is a closely-integrated owner-managed trucking group; the owner was the company representative in all of its 41 subsidiaries in 1991. 28 The group conducted the following reorganisation. In November 1988, just as the VAT bill was passing the Lower House, the group founded a subsidiary, Central there is an alternative explanation based on the operation of Japan's bubble economy.
The surge of founding can also be explained by the high level of domestic investment spurred by loose monetary policy and the rapid appreciation of the yen. 33 Next, we turn to corporation-level data to distinguish these explanations.
Semi-parametric approach
A natural way to identify the overall infl uence of a policy threshold is to examine the size distribution of businesses in the neighbourhood of the threshold. This paper implements kernel density estimation and makes a comparison of distributions in 1988 and 1990.
There are two main issues in implementation. First, sales distributions may change over time for reasons unrelated to the tax structure, for example, due to changes in underlying corporate attributes, such as sectoral composition. Since such infl uences can mask the effects of tax incentives and bias our inference, it is necessary to decompose the change in distribution into that caused by the tax change, and that due to attribute changes.
For the purposes of this decomposition, this study applies the technique developed by Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996, hereafter denoted as DFL) , which is widely applied in the study of wage distributions.
Second, the choice of bandwidth is a general issue in kernel density estimation (Pagan and Ullah, 1999) , and there is a specifi c consideration for our purpose: Kernel density estimation can mask any discontinuity in underlying data by over-smoothing, resulting in under-identifi cation of threshold effects. This is because in evaluating a density f ŷ h at point y, the estimation process uses information at and around y with progressively less weight being placed on distant observations. For example, the estimate of a density at a point immediately below the threshold sales incorporates information from points above the threshold. Since the rule of thumb used in the literature, such as selecting a bandwidth to minimise Mean Integrated Squared Error, does not suit our purpose, we instead present the results for a range of bandwidths.
Data
The data used in this study is from Affi liated Company Data (ACD), which contains information on publicly-traded parents and their child corporations. The sample of corporations in this data is not representative of the whole population of Japanese corporations in two respects. First, the sample consists of relatively large corporations, since ACD is based on a survey of publicly-traded parents. Table 2 presents the distribution of corporate size in terms of paid-in capital. The distribution is heavily skewed to the left for the population.
In 1988, nearly 80 per cent of corporations were in the smallest size category, but the sample is relatively dense on the right and contains fewer than 10 per cent in the same category. Second, the corporations in the sample are members of corporate groups, but most corporations in the population are independent. These two types of discrepancies complicate the extrapolation of this study to the population. Since the tax threshold affects small-to-medium size corporations directly, stronger responses are expected from those groups. Thus, in this respect, the results based on this sample, which contains a small fraction of small companies, may understate the true impact on the population. However, affi liates may respond more fl exibly to the law than independent corporations do; the transaction costs of sales shifting among sibling corporations would be low, but it may be prohibitively high for an independent corporation. Therefore, it is possible for the result based on this sample to overstate any impact sample, unless they are the head of another group, or a subsidiary of a head reported as a subsidiary in another group. The summary statistics are presented in Table 3 . 36 
Methodology
Notations and Assumptions
This section describes the application of the DFL decomposition technique in our study, following Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) . y is a natural logarithm of sales
, is a vector of n company attributes and t is a time period. Each observation is thought of as a vector , x ŷ h that belongs to a joint distribution , x F y t _ i at a given point in time. The probability density function for this joint distribution is denoted as , x f y t _ i. Note that the shape of a joint density at time t can depend on institutional factors, including a tax threshold.
The conditional density function of y on x can be written as,
where x l t _ i is the marginal density of x at time t . By rearranging the expression and taking the integral over the domain of x, which is denoted as x X , we obtain
The middle expression of (density of y) is the marginal density of y at time t since the marginal density of y can be obtained by integrating over x , given that y and x have a joint density (Golberg, 1984) .
Equation (density of y) shows that changes in the density of y can occur through changes in the shape of the conditional density . g^h and through the distribution of x.
If the threshold causes clustering of corporations at n y 1 500 =^h, then
for some representative level of x. In addition, if the threshold affects density around n y 1 500 =^h, the effects are captured by the difference between , 
To make the substitution for the density of x in this expression, it is assumed that the distribution of attributes and the conditional distribution are independent of one another. Specifi cally, it is presumed that the tax change, which is thought to affect the conditional distribution, does not affect the distribution of attributes. In addition, the assumption means that the distribution of attributes will not affect sales conditional on x . 37 If there was an increase in the number of companies in a particular industry, for example, this assumption requires that the goods demanded in the industry increase accordingly, so that companies are not constrained to sell less.
The economy grew robustly by 10.7 per cent over 1988 to 1990 and the price level, in terms of the GDP defl ator, increased by 4.8 per cent. These changes are likely to affect the overall shape of the distribution, including the mean and the spread, but since the analysis on threshold effects is unlikely to be affected, the macroeconomic changes are ignored in this section.
Hypothetical density
To make the counterfactual density estimable, it is re-expressed as follows. 
Note that the counterfactual density is equivalent to the 1990 density, except for the weighting function i . As shown in previous studies, this weight can be simplifi ed by using Bayes' rule:
1988
Using the combined sample of FY1988 and FY1990 data, x P t 1988 = _ i is estimated parametrically by running a probit on the observation belonging to the 1988 sample.
Independent variables in the regression are age, age squared, the natural logarithm of paid-in capital (in million yen), the natural logarithm of number of workers, an indicator for public companies, 2-digit industry dummies and region dummies. It is necessary for the distribution of these independent variables to be unaffected by the VAT threshold; otherwise, the threshold effects would be biased down as changes in these variables capture the impact of the VAT threshold. As a robustness check, paid-in capital and workers were removed from the regression, but results were not sensitive. In addition, the company age variable may be a concern since the number of young companies would increase due to tax-motivated splitting, but since newly created companies are but a small fraction of the overall sample, they are generally unlikely to affect the age distribution.
The rest of the terms in the weighting function (weight) are computed as follows:
h , P t 1990 = h and P t 1988 = h are the proportions of the 1990 and 1988 observations, respectively.
Kernel density estimation
The counterfactual density is estimated by the Rosenblatt-Pazen kernel density estimator,
... i n 1 = are observations from the FY1990 sample. i t is the estimated weight based on (weight), . K^h is the Epanechnikov kernel density function and h is the bandwidth.
The Epanechnikov kernel function has the convenient property of being truncated at points, providing us with information on the range of support involved in estimating a density at each point. As discussed, the choice of bandwidth is an issue. Here, the results are presented for different levels of bandwidth (0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.08, 0.06, 0.04, 0.02).
The bandwidth based on the rule-of-the-thumb formula . n 1 06
i is 0.33 and 0.35 for the 1988 and 1990 sample respectively. Note that the optimal bandwidth differs by samples, as it depends on the sample size n h and standard deviation v h . Thus, for a valid comparison, it may be preferable to vary the bandwidth by varying the per cent reduction from the optimal bandwidth rather than using different levels of common bandwidth.
This alternative method was implemented but the results were generally not sensitive to the change. The benchmark result to be discussed below uses the common bandwidth of 0.08. With the Epanechnikov function, this bandwidth implies that the information on companies from 418 to 598 million yen is used to estimate the density at n 1 500.
Results
Benchmark Result
Figure 3 presents the results for the medium bandwidth of 0.08. It shows the kernel density estimates of the natural log of sales for the samples in FY1988 and FY1990 along with the counterfactual. The vertical line indicates the threshold level of sales, which is the natural log of 500. A visual inspection of the actual densities suggests that around the threshold level of sales, the density is thicker for the post-change density, whereas for greater amount of sales, the pattern reverses. Figure 4 presents, in a solid line, the differences in the actual densities by sales level. At the threshold point, there is a 12.4 per cent increase in the actual density, and the greatest change near the threshold occurs at the sales level of 475 million yen, where the density increases by 15.5 per cent. In contrast, the density declines over the range [570, 990] , which peaks at 845. Taken at face value, this shows that there was a movement of mass from sizes above the threshold to below △ actual △ Attributes △ Institution the threshold. Further, Figure 4 shows that the 1990 density is generally increasing over the range, but there is a slight decrease beyond the threshold point, revealing a clustering of companies just below the threshold. These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis of the institutional effects on the size distribution.
The broad pattern is robust to controlling for the changes in company attributes.
The line corresponding to ∆ Attributes is the actual FY1990 minus the counterfactual; the line corresponding to ∆ Institution is the counterfactual minus the actual FY1988.
In the neighbourhood of the threshold, the estimated changes due to the institution are very close to the actual changes, showing that the change in the attributes did not cause the shift. For example, 95 per cent of the change at the threshold point is attributable to institutional effects.
One notable difference is that the reduction in the mass beyond the threshold point becomes pronounced. The decline occurs in the range [560, 1, 080] , which is wider than in the fi nding without the control. This suggests that the effects of the threshold in this range were stronger than the comparison of actual densities would suggest. It makes economic sense to fi nd strong effects in this range. If a corporation with 1 billion yen in sales is divided into two, the entire amount of sales can be shifted into the preferred status.
In contrast, if the tax status of divesting corporations does not change, the maximum amount of sales that can be shifted is at most 500 million yen per splitting. Since tax benefi ts per splitting are greater for corporations in the range [500, 1,000], the decline in the densities that cover most of this range is highly revealing of the threshold effects.
Overall, the results show a pattern consistent with the infl uence of the tax threshold on the sales distribution around the threshold. To provide a reference for statistical signifi cance, Stephens (1970) .
The general pattern presented in Table 4 confi rms the prediction that the thresh- 
Reliability check
As a reliability check, we applied the same tests in comparing distributions over years where there is no institutional discontinuity. To the extent that the observed differences are caused by noise rather than by the tax change, the tests should reject the null for narrow bandwidths even when there is no change in tax incentives. To ensure that there are no threshold effects, the data used is from a decade later (FY1998 and FY2000). There is neither a threshold at 500 million yen nor a change in the tax threshold in the intervening year. There still is a threshold at 200 million yen but the tests focuses on the distribution above 400 million yen. Table 5 presents the results. For any level of bandwidths, the tests do not reject the null. Thus, this renders support to our interpretation that the difference in the 1988 and 1990 distribution is caused by the tax change.
We checked whether the pattern of shift is stronger in the industries with stronger tax incentives by repeating the analysis on samples split by the level of value-added. We used an estimate by the Ministry of Finance of value-added at 1-digit SIC to split the sample into two. A visual inspection did not suggest any stronger response in high value-added industries. This is the opposite of our conjecture, but this may be refl ecting higher costs of splitting businesses in high value-added industry.
Overall, we fi nd a signifi cant impact of threshold effects on corporate size distribution, but it is not possible to tell from this approach what types of behaviour were responsible for causing the shift. The next section turns to this question and examines the hypothesis that corporations were split to gain tax advantage. 
Parametric approach
Unlike the information on mergers between large corporations, to my knowledge, corporate splitting is not something that is well recorded in Japan or elsewhere, making it a diffi cult type of behaviour on which to conduct a large-scale analysis. Our approach utilises data on corporate groups to overcome this diffi culty. A direct consequence of corporate splitting is an addition of a new member company to a group. In particular, if the tax law that benefi ts businesses with sales sizes below 500 million yen has an infl uence on fi rm decisions, the creation rate of new members with such an attribute increases. Notes: **, * denote signifi cance at 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
To test this hypothesis, we examine the relative propensity of founding small corporations and large corporations from 1985 through 1998. We focus on the relative propensity, rather than the raw number of small business founding, since creations of new corporations are affected by business conditions. To the extent that there is no difference in the changes in creation rates across corporate sizes, the business cycle effects are removed by examining the difference between the founding pattern of small and large corporations. As a validity check of this assumption, we consider a difference-in-difference approach and compare sub-samples based on the degree of incentives as discussed below.
The choice of time period has an advantage in allowing us to study the variation in the tax system in a single regression setting, rather than multiple before-after comparisons for each policy change.
One complication arises from the fact that the variable defi ning the benefi t eligibility is not determined concurrently with the decision to avoid tax. In implementing this approach, we use the sales data generated subsequent to corporate creations. Unlike the amount of paid-in capital over which corporate decision makers would have full control, the level of sales is infl uenced by the business climate after creation and the changes in corporate decision induced by revisions in tax law, in addition to the original intent of decision makers. For example, the 1989 tax change creates an incentive to re-optimise the size of subsidiaries founded before 1989 by dividing an organisation further, or by shifting some operations back to the parent. 38 If such reactions were widespread, the sample from this period would resemble post-introduction observations. Thus the structure of the data would bias the estimate of the effect in the 1989 regime downward. We account for the business cycle infl uence by include explicit controls.
The data set consists of 7,619 subsidiaries founded by 1,842 parent companies from January 1985 through December 1998. As discussed, the level of sales is observed after the founding of a new corporation, and the data is constructed from the seven surveys of ACD that are available for every other year from 1989 to 2001. The information on new subsidiaries is based on ACD surveys conducted three to fi ve years after the year of founding. In each survey, corporations are asked to report fi scal information from the nearest-ending fi scal year, so that fi nancial variables are from corporate fi scal year starting two to four years after the founding. For instance, to construct data on new subsidiaries founded from January 1985 through December 1986, the survey conducted in October 1989 is used, and this survey contains information mainly from FY1988. In selecting the survey to extract information from, we are constrained by data availability. In addition, observations closer to the survey date tend to contain more missing information. 39 In sum, the data has time dimensions but is essentially a cross-section data. this pattern may be caused by other infl uences in the economy. For example, the proportion of manufacturing subsidiaries, which are likely to have a larger optimal scale than those in the service sector, increases fi rst and declines subsequently. To control for the changes in observables, we fi t a binary response model of the following form.
The dependent variable yi indicates whether subsidiary i is a small company with sales less than 500 million yen.
: U ] g is a normal cumulative density function so we will be estimating the probit model. 40 Rti is an indicator for subsidiary i being founded during t th tax regime. Its coeffi cient indicates whether the propensity to found small corporations is different from the base period. The sample period is divided into seven tax regimes on the basis of the implementations of the changes (April 1989 , October 1991 , April 1997 and the expectations of the changes (July 1988 , April 1991 , April 1994 . The base period is the time before July 1988. The timing for the expectation is chosen to satisfy two criteria; details of the relevant amendments had become public knowledge, and the timing of changes had been anticipated. We used newspaper articles in the major fi nancial newspaper, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, to identify these dates. 41 Xi is a vector of individual subsidiary characteristics. AGE is the number of months from the founding until the end of the fi scal year in which fi nancial variables are generated. Two-digit industry dummies and region dummies, which indicate the location of the head offi ce, are included to control for compositional changes. A measure of parent size ( PSIZE ) is the inverse of the natural logarithm of paid-in capital of the parent company. Dummies for parent industries are also included. Seasonality was observed in the overall pattern of founding, so dummies variables for the founding month ( INCMO ) are included. Sales size of companies would be affected by the economic climate in which they operated, thus an industry-specifi c growth rate of value-added from the time of founding until the end of the fi scal year ( GROWTH ) is included. Price levels at the time of observation affect sales in nominal terms, and the statutory threshold does not adjust for nominal changes. 42 GDP defl ators by industry ( PRICE ) are included to control for this infl uence.
Results
The fi rst two columns in Table 7 present the estimated model with and without the regime dummies. The standard error is corrected for hetero-skedasticity and for clustering at the group level. The regime dummies are jointly signifi cant at 1 per cent, indicating that there is a substantial variation in the propensity to found small corporations that is not explained by the changes in control variables. In addition, a test indicates that the regime dummies do not impose a superfi cial structure to the data. 43 The coeffi cients of control variables have the expected signs except for the price level but its coeffi cient is insignifi cant. The model fi t seems sensible; the model predicts correctly 73 per cent of the time and MacFadden's likelihood ratio index is 0.018.
Panel A of Figure 6 presents the marginal effects of regime dummies and their 
Notes:
The fi gures are sample averages for continuous variables, and proportions for dummy variables. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The statistics on PSIZE are based on 7,530 observations. Public utilities and unclassifi ed observations are included in "Other Industries". The sample is divided into four time periods with these three milestones serving as boundaries; the VAT introduction (1989.4), the fi rst amendment (1991.10), and the second amendment (1997.4) No. 370, 2008
confi dence intervals. 44 The propensity to found a small company increases after the announcement of the tax change in June 1988, reaches a peak during the second regime when the VAT was introduced, and declines subsequently. The coeffi cient of the second regime, which is just after the tax reform, is positive and signifi cant. A new company founded in this period is 7.3 per cent more likely to be a small company than those in the base period. The estimates imply that 10.7 per cent of new corporations founded over Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are heteroskedasticity consistent and are corrected for clustering at the group level. ***,**, * denotes the signifi cance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level respectively. For presentation purposes, coeffi cients on dummy variables (two-digit industry, parent's industry, month of incorporation, location of the head quarters) and a constant term are not presented. 3 observations in the mining industry are not used in the analysis because the industry dummy predicts Y perfectly.
July 1988 through March 1991 were due to tax avoidance. 45 While the rest of regime dummies are not signifi cantly different from zero, the decrease from the second regime to the last regime is signifi cant, suggesting that the amendments to the simplifi ed scheme successfully reduced tax incentives. Thus coeffi cients of the regime dummies show a pattern consistent with that implied by tax incentives.
Transition process
One explanation for the decline that occurs after the second regime is that corporations conducted less corporate splitting in response to the announcement of the VAT amendment of 1991, but there is an alternative explanation. Suppose a corporation consists of n divisions that differ in terms of costs of separate incorporation. Given tax incentives, business segments that are least costly to be divided will be the fi rst to be separated. After an initial surge of corporate splitting, we would expect a natural subsiding in corporate splitting activity as it is costly to separate remaining segments. To distinguish between these explanations, the transition process is examined by dividing the fi rst and second regimes into eight sub-regimes. If the announcement effect caused the decline, we do not expect to observe a decline during the second regime.
Panel B of Figure 6 shows that the decline had already started during August-November 1990, favouring the explanation based on a natural reduction. 46 One may point out that the preliminary idea about the amendment was publicised on August 8, 1990
and argue that an expectation of the imminent policy change caused the decline. However, it does not seem plausible to think that the effect of the tax, which reached 11.6
per cent at its peak, would have continued without the policy change. Another possible explanation for the decline is a new regulation on the capital requirement for new corporations. Under the minimum capital requirement, which was enacted in April 1990, newly founded joint-stock corporations had to have paid-in capital of at least 10 million yen.
Such a change would raise a hurdle in founding a new corporation. 47 This explanation, however, seems unconvincing since there was a grace period for existing companies, which
were not required to increase capital until the end of March 1996. As the requirement was not immediately applicable to companies founded before April 1991, when the law went into effect, the cost of founding a company would have been unaffected until then.
Therefore, the change in the commercial law does not explain the decline that occurs during 1990, and it is the natural decline that best explains this pattern. In conjunction with the study by Scholes and Wolfson (1990) that fi nds fi rms respond quickly to tax incentives, our examination suggests tax-motivated structural change occurs within one to two years after the creation of tax incentives.
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Examination of sub-samples
Thus far, the identifi cation strategy relied on the variation in incentives across tax regimes.
The key assumption being that in the absence of tax changes, the relative propensity to found small corporations remains constant after controlling for subsidiary characteristics and for business climates. To provide a validity check for our approach, we tried incorporating cross-section variation in the analysis by considering two observable characteristics that are likely to infl uence the decision to avoid tax, parent size and the level of value-added, for the following reasons. First, for a given corporate splitting, the relative size of tax benefi ts to group profi t is greater when a parent company is small. 48 Second, tax benefi t
(1) is a weakly increasing function of the level of value-added ratio ô h . If tax affected fi rm behaviour, then, we would expect an increase in the likelihood of small parents to establish a small corporation conducting high value-added businesses.
In testing these conjectures, the main diffi culty was the lack of appropriate information on value added at individual entity level. The main data does not contain any information on value added so we instead used matching information from the annual estimates of the value-added ratio by 2-digit SIC industry and by paid-in capital in the First, the sample is divided by median parent size and by median incentive measure and the base model is fi t to them. Table 8 shows the coeffi cient estimates. Comparing the sub-samples by parent size, none of the coeffi cients of tax regime dummies are significantly different from zero in the sub-sample with large parents but some are signifi cant in the small parent sub-sample, strongly suggesting small groups responded actively to the tax incentives as conjectured. Turning to the sub-samples classifi ed by tax incentives, we fi nd somewhat mixed results. While the coeffi cient of the tax regime after the VAT introduction is not signifi cant for the low incentive sub-sample but signifi cant for high incentive sub-sample, the point estimate on the former is positive and is of a moderate size. Moreover, there are signifi cant reductions after the announcement of the second amendment, indicating some non-tax factor might be at work due to the diffi culty in measuring the level of incentives.
Second, we conducted interaction analysis to see if the differences in coeffi cients across sub-samples are statistically signifi cant. We focused on the tax regime after the VAT introduction since the analysis so far suggests that much of the response occurred then.
To implement, the second regime dummy is interacted with the parent size, the incentive measure, and then with both variables. Since the parent size is defi ned as the inverse of the log of parent paid-in capital, smaller parents are associated with higher values of this variable. This means if the response of small parents is signifi cant, the interaction term with the regime dummy will be positive and signifi cant. The incentive measure is defi ned as
o t is the presumed rate of the value-added ratio for i 's
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industry as defi ned in the 1989 tax law. 50 The 1989 law is used to control for any systematic relationship between the incentive measure and the size to isolate the effect of the 1989 institution. If the response is greater in the high incentive industry, the coeffi cient of the interaction term will be positive and signifi cant. Finally, if there is a high response among small parents to set up high value-added subsidiaries, the triple interaction term of the second regime, parent size and incentive measure will be positive and signifi cant.
The results from each examination are shown in Column 3-5 in Table 7 . They indicate a signifi cant infl uence for small parents but not for incentive measure on average. The result does indicate a signifi cant increase in the propensity for small parents to found 
Notes:
Standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are heteroskedasticity consistent and are corrected for clustering at the group level. ***,**, * denotes the signifi cance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level respectively.
high-value added subsidiaries as shown by the coeffi cient of the triple interaction term.
Thus further examinations lend support to the interpretation that the results we fi nd are caused by the tax incentives.
Estimation of Tax Benefi ts
In understanding the consequence of tax-motivated reorganizations, it is of interest to know the scale of benefi ts that arises from corporate splitting, not only because the tax benefi t is a loss of revenue to government, but because it provides an upper bound for the effi ciency loss to fi rms. A rational fi rm would not maintain a separate legal entity if costs, which may include the exacerbation of the principal-agent problem, exceed monetary gains.
Previous studies have estimated the total amount of tax benefi t in the economy, without making any distinction between the windfall gains to qualifying corporations (those that are already in existence or are founded for non-tax reasons) and the tax-avoidance gains.
This section estimates tax benefi ts in the sample, distinguishing between windfall gains and tax-avoidance gains, and extrapolates to the population.
Methodology
The sample is based on the ACD survey conducted during the fall of 1991 asking FY1990
information. The year is chosen to assess the revenue drain prior to the amendment of The total amount of tax benefi t is computed as the sum of tax benefi ts accruing to sample corporations deemed to qualify on the basis of past sales, taking into account three types of special treatment; the simplifi ed scheme, exemption and the phasing out of exemption.
Since tax avoidance is not observable, the parametric model is necessary to assess its revenue consequence. A simple approach is to apportion the total tax benefi ts on the basis of the fi nding that attributes 10.7 per cent of corporate founding over July 1988
through March 1991 to tax avoidance. Since the result from this approach is aggregated over all industries and sizes, in an alternative approach, we utilise the entity-level information to obtain fi ner estimates. Using the coeffi cients of the interaction model (Column 5, Table 7 ), we predicted the size of corporation (i.e. greater than 500 million yen or not)
on the basis of observables excluding the regime coeffi cients and the interaction terms.
We classifi ed as tax motivated newly founded corporations that are predicted to be large but are in fact small. An amount of 12.7 per cent of foundings is tax-motivated under this approach, so the two approaches are largely comparable. This approach further allows us to account for the effect of splitting on divesting corporations. As the anecdotal example shows, the tax benefi ts accrue to a divesting corporation if it remains small as a result of splitting. The divesting corporations are identifi ed through matching address with tax-motivated corporations.
Three considerations are important in interpreting this exercise. First, the sample is based on groups headed by large corporations. Our analysis showed that there is active tax avoidance among smaller groups, but the vast majority of corporations in the population is unaffi liated with other companies. Thus the direction of bias is ambiguous in this respect.
Second, it is diffi cult to account for the amount of tax benefi ts recaptured by the authority through the corporate income tax as discussed above, and here, we report the tax benefi t fi gure without making an adjustment for the income tax. Third, as already discussed, the information on value-added is based on the population average that does not incorporate investment expense, and this is likely to result in overestimation. Overall, the results from these exercises should be viewed as an upper bound for the tax revenue loss. 52 Table 9 summarises the tax benefi ts to the population of corporations in Japan, excluding the fi nancial sector, extrapolated from the sample estimate using weights based on the number of corporations at each industry-size cell. The total tax benefi t in the economy is 669 billion yen ($4.5 billion) in 1990. This constitutes 14.5 per cent of the total VAT receipt, meaning 14.5 yen in 100 yen of tax receipts was channeled from consumers to producers. The amount is more than three times the government expenditure on small and medium sized enterprise in the general account of 1990 (194 billion yen). As 87 per cent of the total benefi ts accrued to corporations in the smallest size category, the tax benefi ts were a substantial subsidy in disguise to small and medium sized enterprises, including subsidiaries of large parents. The benefi ts accrued mostly to the small manufacturing corporations as a group, in part due to the prominence of the sector in the economy, but it is the transportation industry that benefi ted the most in terms of per company benefi ts. The estimate is higher than those from the previous study by the Ministry of Finance (¥480 billion) and by Doi (¥560 billion), refl ecting the relatively accurate classifi cation method but also due to the fact that it does not account for investment expenditure. 53
Results and Interpretation
Under the simple approach, 2.7 per cent of the total tax benefi t arises from the tax motive, having a 95 per cent confi dence interval of 0.3 to 5.9 per cent. The alternative approach similarly attributes 3.4 per cent to the tax motive, 13.3 per cent of which is due to having a divesting body qualify for special treatment. In terms of absolute value, tax avoidance caused a revenue drain of 22 billion yen ($146 million). Thus, the tax motivated gains are small relative to the windfall gains, making up about 0.5 per cent of the total tax receipt. Most interestingly, a comparison by industry reveals that 23 per cent of tax benefi ts to transportation subsidiaries was attributable to tax motives. It appears that tax avoidance was widespread amongst trucking companies, but a comparison by parent industry shows that it is not necessarily the case. It is the manufacturing parents which have the highest fraction of tax benefi ts attributable to tax motives (5.8 per cent), followed by transportation, retail, and construction. This indicates that a rather broad range of parent companies split business segments undertaking transportation-related activities and that there are relatively low costs of splitting transportation segments. Third, a common method seems to have involved separately incorporating a transportation segment, suggesting little organizational disadvantages to such a transaction. The overall impact of tax-motivated splitting on the revenue performance of VAT was, however, rather modest, causing a drain of 0.5 per cent of total VAT receipt in 1990, due to the fact that gains to each fi rm were small. The fi rst approximation of the effi ciency loss, which is half the revenue loss, implied by this study is 11 billion yen ($73 million).
Overall, to the extent that the profi t motive dominates decisions of fi rms operating in different countries, this study suggests masquerading behaviour may be commonplace in tax as well as regulatory systems in various countries around the world, especially since the results indicate that a modest benefi t induces behavioural changes at a large scale.
Nonetheless, this study focused on an environment where anti-avoidance clauses are suffi ciently loose due to the political reason. It would be interesting to explore the role of anti-avoidance provisions and their enforcement in further studies. Lastly, a threshold is a common component in a host of public policies that favour small over large fi rms.
In this author's opinion, the masquerading by fi rms is likely to be left undocumented in variety of other settings.
Notes 1 For example, Title I of the Americans with Disability Act prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment by businesses having 15 or more employees. In a small business support program in the UK analysed by Wren and Storey (2002) , the eligibility requirement is no more than 500 employees. Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, small oil refi ners below a set production capacity were not subjected to price controls (Viscusi et al. 2001) . Under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment, the federal government mandated that states formulate a program applicable to organisations that own or operate more than 10 vehicles in designated areas (Callan and Thomas 2004) . 2 Similarly, after the Second World War, the US banks sought to overcome the restriction on interstate banking by separately chartering banks in different states (Matasar and Heiney 2002) . 3
More than 120 countries adopt VAT and thresholds are incorporated in the majority of them. As for the OECD nations with a VAT, 84 per cent adopt a threshold. See Ebrill et al. (2001) for an international summary. 4
As is well known in the VAT literature, there is a disadvantage in not registering to fi le a VAT under the invoice system, which is adopted in most counties. Japan uses the account system instead. Under the invoice system, registered fi rms, in general, have incentives to avoid purchasing from exempt fi rms, because nonregistered fi rms are not allowed to issue invoices that registered fi rms use to obtain tax credits. However, there is no such concern for fi rms that deal with fi nal consumers, thus a VAT exemption would still be attractive in retail and service sectors. 5
Kankei Kaisha Data, also published in print as Nihon no Kigyo Gurupu by Toyo Keizai Co. Westney (1996) provides discussion on corporate groups, sometimes referred to as a vertical keiretsu or capital keiretsu. 6
This paper uses the average dollar-yen exchange rate of 1990 and calculates one dollar to be one hundred and fi fty yen. 7
Goolsbee and Maydew (2002) is similar to this study in focusing on divisive operations. Other studies on tax avoidance by fi rms include income shifting by multi-national corporations (Grubert and Mutti 1991; Hines and Rice, 1994; Grubert and Slemrod 1998) and the choice of organizational form (Gordon and MacKie-Mason 1990 . 8 Ebrill et al. (2001, p121) discuss the case of a VAT threshold. Scholes et al. (2002) discuss the effect of taxes on organisational structure in general. 9
Another example is the effects of taxes on merger and acquisition activities, where the evidence in the literature is mixed (for example, Scholes and Wolfson 1990; Auerbach and Reishus 1988) . 10 See also Pedone (1981) . 11 Khanna and Yafeh (2005) provide a recent synthesis of international studies on business groups. See Yafeh (2000) for a review of studies on Japanese business groups and Granovetter (1995) for a review of sociology studies. 12 See Homma and Atoda (1989) for a discussion on small business treatment. Ishi (2001) offers a comprehensive overview of the Japanese VAT. Kaizuka (1992) provides a broad overview of the historical backgrounds of the 1989 reform. Discussions by Noguchi (1992) and Hatta (1992) illustrate the main political issues from opposing perspectives. Kishi (1998) provides a narrative account of the reform. 13 Automobiles were taxed at 6 per cent as a transition measure from the replaced indirect tax on automobiles, which was 23 per cent. 14 The LDP efforts to introduce a VAT were met with strong oppositions; there had been two failed attempts in 1979 and in 1987, and 71 per cent of public was against the tax bill in a poll conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun on 23 February 1989 (Ishi 2001, p280) . To win support from small businesses in passing a VAT bill, including from the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI), a leading opposition group in the 1987 attempt, the LDP engaged in a series of dialogue with its business constituent. During April 1988, the LDP special committee on tax reform conducted hearings involving 338 organisations, including business associations and LDP local branches (Kishi 1998, p137) . The tax bill that fi nally passed included concessions that JCCI expressed support for. 15 The Japanese VAT initially had two categories for the presumed rate of value-added. All industries, except the wholesale industry, had the rate of 80 per cent; the rate for the wholesale industry was 90 per cent. 16 See Ishi (2001 p282) . 17 For simplicity, investments are ignored in this discussion. 18 In April 2004, the simplifi ed scheme threshold was reduced further to 50 million yen. 19 There are various types of grouping of companies that exist for different reasons. A corporate group in this study referred to a group of corporations affi liated though the ownership of capital and is sometimes referred to as a capital keiretsu (see Westney 1998) . A distinction should be from a horizontal keiretsu, which refers to a group centered on the main bank system. 20 It is assumed, for the illustration purposes, that the taxable sales in the current year determine the tax status. Although the tax status in year t is determined by level of sales in t-2 in practice, the tax treatment is still discontinuous at the threshold. Reinterpreting the sales on the x-axis to be constant annual sales generated over a fi xed period of time, the hidden subsidy in present value terms would give the exact same shape. 21 This example is reported by a popular centre-left newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, April 24 (evening edition), 1989. 22 It is reported that in setting up a new sports merchandise shop in a new location, the tax motive infl uenced the company's decision to set up a legally separate corporation, rather than a branch. 23 The rate is the effective tax rate on corporate income as at 1990 and includes corporate income tax, enterprise tax, and corporate resident tax. 24 One component of the transaction costs is the registration license tax, which is 7 mills of the paid-in capital with the minimum of 150,000 yen for founding of joint stock corporations. 25 If divested companies were founded by investment in kind and its shares were closely held by related parties, a divested company is aggregated with the parent for the purpose of the VAT. Even so, if a subsidiary is classifi ed in a different two-digit industry from its parent, it is taxed separately in subsequent years (Yamamoto 1996) . 26 Establishing a company by investment in kind is a cumbersome method that involves assessment of assets by a third party, and it lacks popularity (Niiyama 2001, p56) . 27 This case was identifi ed while estimating the tax benefi ts. 28 According to the FY2002 fi nancial report fi led with the Stock and Exchange Commission, his son was the executive director of the parent company (http://info.edinet.go.jp/InfoDisclosure/alphabet/index. jsp). The large number of subsidiaries is in part due to this fi rm's national network of parcel delivery. 29 The names of subsidiaries are translated by this author since their offi cial English names could not be obtained. 30 As already noted, there are provisions against tax-motivated division, and in determining the tax status, the divested company may be counted as part of a divesting company, under certain form of divisions. Without more information on the circumstances, it is not possible to ascertain that the divestiture was successfully reduced the tax liability. However, in this particular case, it seems fair to say that the two companies were taxed separately. This is because the industry classifi cation of CJOS is different from that of DI, and the voting stock held within the group is less than 50 per cent. 31 The spike in 1996 is caused the conversions of small joint-stock corporations to limited-liability corporations.
It is a result of the change in the minimum capital requirement for joint-stock corporations. 32 In June 1988, the proposal for the preferential treatment of small companies was publicised, and JCCI, the leading opposition to the earlier LDP initiative, publicised its acceptance of the reform. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 3 (evening edition), 1988. 33 See Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (1997) for a discussion on the bubble economy of the late 1980s. 34 The summary of the EEC is published at the website of the Statistics Bureau, Government of Japan (http://www.stat.go.jp/data/jigyou/2001/index2.htm). 35 The reform law was fi rst passed by the Lower House in November 1988, but the reform proposal, which eventually passed with minor amendments, became known to the public on June 15, 1988 (Ishi 2002, p276) . 36 Further details of the data are explained in Onji (2005) . 37 In the study by DFL on wage distributions, it is assumed that wage structures do not depend on the underlying distribution of attributes, such as education levels. For instance, this assumption rules out the possibility that an increase in the supply of educated labour force reducing the return to education. 38 In addition, the sales information from subsidiaries founded over 1989-90 samples is based on FY1992, that is to say, after the fi rst amendment that reduced the tax incentive. Re-optimization in the form of mergers and expansion would make these samples resemble the post-amendment samples. 39 Even when the data is available, there is a concern that the level of sales is affected by a shorter fi nancial year. For these reasons, the sample is restricted to the subsidiaries with at lease one year in operation at the beginning of the fi scal year. As a result, the youngest subsidiary in the sample is 24 months old, as of the end of the fi scal year. 40 The logit model yields a similar prediction and the results are not reported here. 41 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 3 (evening edition), 1988; April 13, 1991; March 15, 1994 . As discussed in the earlier footnote, the leading opposition group expressed support for the proposed plan in June 1988. In March-April 1991, as a result of the Socialist Party's compromise in agreeing to amend the tax, the prospect of a change in October 1991 became imminent. The proposal for the amendment had been publicised in August 1990. In April 1994, the government announced a planned amendment to the preferential treatment. 42 In addition, a quadratic term for AGE is included to control for possible non-linearity in age. Quadratic controls for GROWTH and PRICE were included to check robustness, but they did not make a signifi cant change. 43 The model restricts the effects within a regime to be constant while allowing for cross-regime differences.
An alternative is a fl exible model that allows for within-regime differences. For example, a model with an indicator for each founding month. We present the results from the parsimonious model since the latter model is informative about within regime variation but estimates are much volatile. We conducted a test of restriction by comparing the base model with the one with 167 dummy variables for each founding month. Other than the regime dummies, both models have the same specifi cation and do not include the control for founding month to avoid collinearity. A likelihood ratio test did not reject the hypothesis that two models are the same at 10 per cent level of signifi cance. 44 It is conventional to evaluate the marginal effects at the means of regressors, and we followed the convention to compute the values presented in the fi gure. An alternative way is to take an average of marginal effects evaluated at each data point. This alternative method produces conservative estimates; the absolute value of each estimate is 14 per cent lower than that estimated from the conventional method. 45 The computation is based on the assumption that the ratio of the number of small to large new corporations remains at pre-expectation level. 46 One interesting pattern in the fi gure is the dip just before the implementation. The level is not signifi cantly different from zero, but it may be refl ecting the incentive to delay the founding of a subsidiary. Newly founded entities are exempted from the VAT for their fi rst two years of operation. So an entity, which was initially scheduled to open in March, could extend the exempted period by a month, by delaying registration to April. The pattern is consistent with an explanation that there were birthday shiftings of smaller companies. 47 This commercial law reform was in part a policy response to sole proprietors incorporating their business for tax purposes, according to the Justice Department (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 3, 1990, p7) . 48 One might be concerned that the paid-in capital of the parent will fall due to spin-offs. I tried replacing PSIZE with an alternative control for a group size, which is defi ned to be the sum of paid-in capital from group companies, but the results were not affected. 49 Given the consumption-type VAT in Japan, buyers receive full credit for tax paid on capital equipment provided that they are fi ling an ordinary return. Filers of the simplifi ed return forgo this benefi t, resulting in a higher effective tax payment in a year where large investments are made. Thus for ⅴ to measure the level of incentives accurately, the value of inputs should include the total amount of investment outlay in a given year, rather than the amount of capital depreciation, unlike in the standard computation of value added. 50 Strictly speaking the incentive measure should be truncated below zero if < o o t to account for the tax provision that allows companies to renounce the simplifi ed scheme. The results are not sensitive to this consideration. 51 Doi (1990) bases his classifi cation on current sales but this results in an underestimation of tax benefi ts due to company growth: Companies selling in excess of 500 million yen are eligible to fi le a simplifi ed return if their sales were below the threshold in the base year. My comparison of these different classifi cation methods indicates that the total benefi t is 34 per cent lower when current sales is used. 52 Further details on the estimation method are outlined in Onji (2005) . 53 The estimate by Ministry of Finance is as reproduced in Homma and Atoda (1989) . Doi (1990) does not report the total tax benefi ts and the fi gure here is based on the average tax benefi ts and the approximate sample size in his paper.
